These UNI were delegated from the treasury in 2022 and 2023 – 2.5M to the Uniswap Foundation and 10M to a group of active delegates - during periods of low governance participation. The delegations aimed to establish an active delegate base when quorum faced risks.
The governance landscape has transformed significantly. Token holders actively delegate voting power, and since DUNI's establishment, passed proposals have averaged roughly 75 million votes in turnout, exceeding quorum by approximately 88%. Over 50 delegates now hold more than 1M UNI in voting power.
Undelegating these tokens addresses potential misalignment created by the Franchiser mechanism itself. While selected delegates participated actively in governance, the Franchiser didn't ensure structural alignment between voting power and economic exposure. This misalignment should not persist when the original implementation rationale no longer applies.
This proposal invokes recallMany on the FranchiserFactory contract (0xf754A7E347F81cFdc70AF9FbCCe9Df3D826360FA) to retrieve all UNI currently delegated through the Franchiser system, returning the recalled tokens to the Governance Timelock (0x1a9C8182C09F50C8318d769245beA52c32BE35BC).
Eight Franchiser delegations are targeted for undelegation, totaling ~12.5M UNI:
| Recipient | Address | Votes |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Uniswap Foundation | 0xA37131410A76791f4A0210e91EDD554d85aFb4d4 | 2,500,001.19 |
| Anode | 0xECC2a9240268BC7a26386ecB49E1Befca2706AC9 | 2,499,858 |
| Axia Network | 0xE93D59CC0bcECFD4ac204827eF67c5266079E2b5 | 2.25M |
| PGov | 0x3fb19771947072629c8eee7995a2ef23b72d4c8a | 2.25M |
| Wintermute | 0xB933AEe47C438f22DE0747D57fc239FE37878Dd1 | 1.9M |
| Keyrock | 0x1855f41B8A86e701E33199DE7C25d3e3830698ba | 494K |
| KPK | 0x8787FC2De4De95c53e5E3a4e5459247D9773ea52 | 453K |
| Atiselsts.eth | 0xAac35d953Ef23aE2E61a866ab93deA6eC0050bcD | 154K |
The UF Franchiser has accumulated ~1.19 UNI of unrelated inbound transfers from third parties since it was funded. recall always sweeps the full balance (the Franchiser contract has no partial-recall option), so those stray amounts will return to the Treasury along with the original 2.5M.
because returning the 12.5M UNI to the Governance Timelock is a logical and timely step that reflects the maturation of Uniswap's governance ecosystem. The original Franchiser delegations successfully served their purpose of bootstrapping quorum and active delegates during low-participation periods in 2022 and 2023. However, with the introduction of DUNI driving average turnouts well past 75 million votes, artificially bolstering voting power is no longer required.
I am voting yes on this proposal to return the 12.5 million delegated UNI tokens from the Franchiser contracts back to the Governance Timelock treasury. While these initial treasury delegations were necessary to secure quorum during a period of low participation in 2022 and 2023, the Uniswap governance landscape has matured significantly, with organic voter turnout now consistently exceeding quorum requirements. Recalling these tokens successfully fixes the structural misalignment between voting power and economic exposure, ensuring the protocol's governance remains decentralized, secure, and driven by active stakeholders.
0xA37131410A76791f4A0210e91EDD554d85aFb4d4,0xECC2a9240268BC7a26386ecB49E1Befca2706AC9,0xE93D59CC0bcECFD4ac204827eF67c5266079E2b5,0x3FB19771947072629C8EEE7995a2eF23B72d4C8A,0xB933AEe47C438f22DE0747D57fc239FE37878Dd1,0x1855f41B8A86e701E33199DE7C25d3e3830698ba,0x8787FC2De4De95c53e5E3a4e5459247D9773ea52,0xAac35d953Ef23aE2E61a866ab93deA6eC0050bcD
0x1a9C8182C09F50C8318d769245beA52c32BE35BC,0x1a9C8182C09F50C8318d769245beA52c32BE35BC,0x1a9C8182C09F50C8318d769245beA52c32BE35BC,0x1a9C8182C09F50C8318d769245beA52c32BE35BC,0x1a9C8182C09F50C8318d769245beA52c32BE35BC,0x1a9C8182C09F50C8318d769245beA52c32BE35BC,0x1a9C8182C09F50C8318d769245beA52c32BE35BC,0x1a9C8182C09F50C8318d769245beA52c32BE35BC